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The United States Attorney is in a unique and powerful position
to affect the lives of many persons in the administration of justice
in his district.1 He is vested with broad discretionary authority as
the district's chief federal law enforcement officer and prosecutor;
this includes the authority to initiate investigations and to bring
charges.2 In exercising his responsibilities, he must be vigorous and
vigilant in attacking crime, but must temper his zeal with a recog-
nition that his broader responsibilities are to seek justice and not
merely to prosecute with the single-minded goal of winning cases
and achieving convictions. He must seek to protect the innocent, as
well as to vindicate the public's interest against those who violate
its laws. His client is the public whose interest is in justice being
served, not merely the parochial interests of a government agency.
In an oft-quoted passage, the Supreme Court described the obli-
gations of United States Attorneys as follows:
* A.B. 1966, Princeton University; 1966-67, Union Theological Seminary (N.Y.); J.D.
1970, University of Virginia. The author served as United States Attorney for the Western
District of Virginia from May 14, 1980, to November 25, 1981. He is now in private practice
with Martin, Hopkins, Lemon and Canter, P.C., in Roanoke, Virginia. This article was
adapted from a lecture given at Washington and Lee University School of Law in 1982. The
author wishes to acknowledge with gratitude the research assistance of Craig S. Davis, then
a third-year student at Washington and Lee University School of Law.
1. The 94 United States Attorneys, appointed by the President with the advice and con-
sent of the Senate, serve in 95 judicial districts in the 50 states, the Virgin Islands, the
Canal Zone, Guam, and the North Marianna Islands. See 28 U.S.C. § 541 (1976). Each state
and territory has at least one district, and each district has one United States Attorney,
except that the districts of Guam and the North Marianna Islands share a United States
Attorney.
2. See 28 U.S.C. § 547 (1976). The United States Attorney is charged with (1) prosecuting
all offenses against the United States in his district, (2) prosecuting and defending all civil
cases on behalf of the federal government and its agencies, (3) defending revenue and cus-
toms agents, and (4) collecting debts, revenue, fines, penalties and forfeitures owed to the
United States. Id. While this article discusses professional responsibilities related to crimi-
nal prosecution, the duty of the United States Attorney to adhere to the highest ethical
standards applies in civil matters as well.
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
The United States Attorney is the representative not of an ordi-
nary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to
govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all;
and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it
shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a
peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law, the twofold
aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer. He
may prosecute with earnestness and vigor-indeed he should do so.
But while he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul
ones. It is as much his duty to refrain from improper methods calcu-
lated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legiti-
mate means to bring about a just one.3
While defense counsel are given broad leeway in defense of the
accused, the prosecutor as representative of the sovereign should
strive to epitomize the twin ethic of integrity and fairness.4 The
3. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
4. Former Attorney General Benjamin R. Civiletti has written:
The lines which are so carefully drawn to limit the scope of advocacy do not, however,
constrain prosecution and defense equally. The sixth amendment right to counsel car-
ries with it the right to zealous representation, and its force presses the defense law-
yer to the outer boundaries of the system. Failure to be sufficiently vigorous risks the
client's liberty and reputation, while zealousness risks little. The only immediate
sanction for overstepping these boundaries is the contempt citation, a penalty rarely
imposed. On the other hand, the prosecutor must be constantly alert that he does not
even come close to the bounds of propriety, that there be not even the suggestion of
overreaching. He must be cognizant of the specific rules which govern his conduct
and of the risk that he will be perceived to be misusing his power, or the possibility
that he will taint the proceeding through some generalized or cumulative violation of
fair process.
Civiletti, The Prosecutor As Advocate, 25 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1, 17 (1979). See generally
Freedman, The Professional Responsibility of the Prosecuting Attorney, 55 GEo. L. J. 1030,
1033-34 (1967); Schneider & Marks, The Contrasting Ethical Duties of the Prosecutor and
Defense Attorney in Criminal Cases, 7 U. WEST L.A. L. REV. 120 (1975).
Some scholars have even asserted the propriety of allowing defense counsel to permit a
client to perjure himself. See, e.g., Freedman, Professional Responsibility of the Criminal
Defense Lawyer: The Three Hardest Questions, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1469, 1475-78, 1482-84
(1966). However, perjury by the defendant and subornation of perjury by counsel are illegal
acts for which both may be subject to criminal prosecution. See Bress, Professional Ethics
in Criminal Trials: A View of Defense Counsel's Responsibility, 64 MicH. L. REV. 1493,
1496 (1966).
The American Bar Association's Commission on Evaluation of Professional Standards
considered the lawyer's duties where his client insists on giving testimony which the lawyer
knows to be perjurious. Three solutions were proposed: (1) to permit the accused to testify
by a narrative without guidance by a lawyer's questions, (2) to excuse the advocate entirely
from the duty to disclose the perjury, and (3) to require that the lawyer reveal the client's
perjury if necessary to rectify the matter. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.3
comment, at 21 (Final Draft 1981), reprinted in 68 A.B.A.J. 1298 (1982).
The ABA Commission initially took the position that an advocate's duty to refuse to offer
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maintenance of a fair and lawful system of investigating and prose-
cuting crime is paramount to the safeguarding of freedom and lib-
erty. According to the values governing the administration of crim-
inal justice, the fairness of procedures takes precedence over the
conviction of any single offender. The procedural safeguards set
forth in the Bill of Rights and the presumption of innocence en-
joyed by an accused in a criminal case, coupled with the burden on
the government to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, express
the societal value that it is more important that the innocent be
free than the guilty, punished.
The ethical responsibilities of the United States Attorney in ad-
ministering criminal laws differ markedly from those which govern
his advocacy in civil matters on behalf of client agencies." In the
latter, his duties more closely track those of the private practi-
tioner who is responsible for representing his client's special inter-
est and who must obtain his client's authority before initiating or
settling litigation. Even in civil matters, however, his public re-
sponsibility may overshadow the particular interest of a govern-
ment agency since he is responsible for maintaining ultimate con-
trol over litigation tactics and strategy; and he must ensure that
opposing parties are treated fairly and even-handedly by the gov-
ernment. In administering criminal laws, the prosecutor has no
identifiable client. Instead, he makes decisions a client would make
and the interest he seeks to vindicate is the general welfare of soci-
ety in the pursuit of justice.
The Model Code of Professional Responsibility sets forth the
broad ethical standards of the prosecutor as follows:
The responsibility of a public prosecutor differs from that of the
usual advocate; his duty is to seek justice, not merely to convict.
This special duty exists because: (1) the prosecutor represents the
sovereign and therefore should use restraint in the discretionary ex-
ercise of governmental powers, such as in the selection of cases to
evidence he knows to be false and to reveal his client's perjury is qualified by the constitu-
tional provisions of due process and right to counsel in criminal cases. The ethical duty of
candor toward the court may in particular circumstances and in some jurisdictions be super-
seded by the Constitution. Id. at 21-22. Subsequently, the Commission deleted the constitu-
tional qualification of the canon. The final report provides without qualification that a law-
yer should refuse to offer evidence he reasonably believes is false. See The New Model
Rules of Professional Conduct: A Report to the Bar, 68 A.B.A.J. 1019, 1022 (1982).
5. See generally M. SCHwARTZ, LAwYERs AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM: CASES AND MATERIALS
241-69 (1979).
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prosecute; (2) during trial the prosecutor is not only an advocate but
he also may make decisions normally made by an individual client,
and those affecting the public interest should be fair to all; and (3)
in our system of criminal justice, the accused is to be given the ben-
efit of all reasonable doubts.6
In addition, there are myriad guideposts in the statutes, depart-
mental regulations, policy statements' and court decisions which
govern the prosecutor's conduct.
Such standards are often too general to provide specific instruc-
tion for each of the prosecutor's many and complex decisions. His
daily decisions to investigate and prosecute crime and his dealings
with targets of investigations, witnesses, and defense counsel must
therefore be guided in the final analysis by his own personal stan-
dards of integrity and fairness. To insure consistency in the deal-
ings of his office with others, the United States Attorney should
strive to infuse his office with his own high standards to augment
the more general professional canons, statutes, departmental regu-
lations, and case decisions. To insure that his office adheres to
these standards he must establish an internal system of accounta-
bility and control.8
This article discusses the federal prosecutor's professional re-
sponsibilities in dealing with ethical issues and policy considera-
tions in the various stages and features of criminal prosecution: the
conduct of investigations, the decision to charge, grand jury pro-
ceedings, discovery matters, plea bargaining, the conduct of the
trial, and relations with the press.
II. INVESTIGATIONS
A. Priorities
The decision to investigate often involves a policy consideration
of setting priorities because the federal government has limited ju-
6. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-13 (1979).
7. In an effort to standardize federal prosecutional policies and practices, the Department
of Justice has published a policy statement. See U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, PRINCIPLES OP FED-
ERAL PROSECUTION (1980) [hereinafter cited as PRINCIPLES]. This publication was designed to
rationalize the decision making process while maintaining needed flexibility. It is therefore
presented in general terms merely to provide guidelines rather than to mandate particular
results. Id., preface at i. Thus, the principles expressly decline to grant any substantive
rights and are nonenforceable in court. Id. at 4.
8. Id. at 203.
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risdiction over the investigation and prosecution of crimes" and has
limited investigative and prosecutorial resources. The setting of
priorities also reflects a judgment about the relationship between
federal and state law enforcement efforts. Criminal activities often
overlap federal and state jurisdictions. Therefore, the determina-
tion of which authority will assume jurisdiction over a given case"
depends on the particular violations involved, a balancing of the
relative federal and state interests, and a comparison of the inves-
tigative and prosecutory resources of both sovereigns."
To combat certain forms of fraud and corruption, the federal
prosecutor has at his disposal a more effective arsenal of criminal
statutes than does his state counterpart. For example, cases involv-
ing official corruption, business fraud, and organized crime have
been prosecuted successfully in federal court when state statutes
were inadequate. The Hobbs Act, 2 the Travel Act,' the mail and
wire fraud statutes, 4 the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Orga-
nizations (RICO) Act, 5 and the Internal Revenue Code' have suc-
cessfully been used to root out corrupt local and state officials and
to combat organized and white collar crime. 17 The federal conspir-
9. See generally Schwartz, Federal Criminal Jurisdiction and Prosecutor's Discretion, 13
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 64 (1948). Most common law crimes-such as assault, burglary,
larceny, murder, robbery and rape-are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the state and
local authorities. Federal jurisdiction to combat crime is derived from several specific consti-
tutional provisions, including the power to regulate interstate commerce, the taxing powers,
the power to issue currency, the control over the mails, and the chartering of national banks.
The federal government also has the inherent power to regulate its own programs and to
supervise the conduct of its own officials.
10. Under the theory of "dual sovereignty," dual prosecution in federal and state courts
for the same act is not barred by the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment. United
States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978); Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187 (1959); Bart-
kus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959). The policy of the Department of Justice, however, is not
to prosecute a person who is already being tried by state authorities, absent an overriding
federal interest. See Petite v. United States, 361 U.S. 529 (1960); U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE,
UNITED STATES ArroRNEY's MANUAL § 9-2.142 (1979) [hereinafter cited as U.S. ATTORNEY'S
MANUAL]. Such an interest may exist, for example, in a civil rights case.
In Virginia, a "prosecution or proceeding" in federal court is a bar to state prosecution.
See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-294 (Repl. Vol. 1975).
11. See generally Ruff, Federal Prosecution of Local Corruption: A Case Study in the
Making of Law Enforcement Policy, 65 GEo. L.J. 1171 (1977).
12. 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1976) (anti-racketeering legislation).
13. Id. § 1952 (1976) (prohibits interstate or foreign travel in aid of racketeering).
14. Id. §§ 1341-43 (1976).
15. Id. §8 1961-68 (1976).
16. Id. §8 7201-17 (1976).
17. See Ewing, Combating Official Corruption by All Available Means, 10 MEm. ST. U.L.
REv. 424 (1980) (discussing the statutes often used in prosecuting public officials).
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acy law' s also allows the federal prosecutor to tie together evidence
of criminal activity in obtaining convictions where more narrow
state laws might not succeed.
Considerations of federal-state relations and judgments about
the relative interests of the respective sovereigns in a particular
case also enter into the decision to investigate. For example, in re-
cent years federal authorities have substantially reduced the inci-
dence of Dyer Act 9 prosecutions on the ground that automobile
theft primarily affects state and local interests. In addition, opin-
ions differ about the appropriateness of federal investigation and
prosecution of local public officials, absent an impact of such local
corruption on a primary federal interest.20
Finally, a weighing of the resources commanded by the respec-
tive sovereigns for investigating and prosecuting a particular case
is a significant factor in the decision whether to initiate a federal
investigation. Federal law enforcement agencies-including the
Federal Bureau of Investigation, Drug Enforcement Administra-
tion, Secret Service, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, In-
ternal Revenue Service, and Inspectors General of the various de-
partments-in general have at their disposal substantially greater
resources to devote to a particular investigation than do their state
and local counterparts. Likewise, the federal prosecutor's caseload
18. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1976). See generally Marcus, Conspiracy: The Criminal Agreement
in Theory and in Practice, 65 GEo. L.J. 925, 942-46 (1977) (advantages of federal prosecu-
tion of conspiracy cases).
19. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2311-2313 (1976) (interstate transportation of stolen vehicles). Guide-
lines for investigating and prosecuting such cases requires the existence of an organized ring
or multiple thefts and forbids pursuing cases involving joyriding, first offenders, and
juveniles without prior arrests. See U.S. ATrORNEY'S MANUAL, supra note 10, § 9-61.133.
20. See United States v. Archer, 486 F.2d 670 (2d Cir. 1973). The court, in reversing on
jurisdictional grounds corruption convictions involving a local prosecutor, questioned the
propriety of such investigations by the federal authorities. The court questioned whether
the prosecution should be dismissed because "the initiative of the investigation was founded
on a grossly inflated conception of the role of the federal criminal law," id. at 677, since the
federal agents had no information that the alleged corruption in the local district attorney's
office involved federal violations. See also United States v. Craig, 528 F.2d 773, 779 (7th Cir.
1976), cert. denied sub nom. Markert v. United States, 425 U.S. 973; 429 U.S. 999, reh'g
denied, 429 U.S. 1066 (1977). "While it is within the province of the United States Attorney
to prosecute local officials who violate federal law, the primary responsibility for ferreting
out their political corruption must rest, until Congress directs otherwise, with the State, the
political unit most directly involved." 528 F.2d at 779.
This view has been vigorously contested by Whitney North Seymour, Jr., who points out
"[o]verwhelmingly, cases where corruption has been unearthed and successfully prosecuted
have been those where an outside investigative body-often the Federal Government-has
been involved." W. SEYMOUR, UNITED STATES ATrORNEY 174 (1975).
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is substantially less voluminous than that of the state prosecutor,
who must handle a multitude of traffic cases as well as major felo-
nies. The federal prosecutor also has at his disposal the Witness
Protection Program, which has been an indispensable tool for the
prosecution of organized crime figures. Finally, he has available the
grand jury for investigating complex criminal activities. Only a
small number of state prosecutors have available and use the grand
jury as an investigative tool.21
In view of these considerations, the Justice Department in recent
years has established formal priorities as a guide to deployment of
federal investigative and prosecutorial resources. These include:
white collar crime, public corruption, organized crime, and narcot-
ics and dangerous drugs. More recently the Reagan Administration
has added violent crime to this list. The United States Attorney
may establish his own priorities to fit the special considerations in
his district within the priorities set nationally by the Attorney
General.22 For example, districts with major port or border en-
trances may emphasize drug smuggling. In the Western District of
Virginia, one emphasis in recent years has been enforcing the 1977
Mine Safety and Health Act because southwest Virginia is a major
coal producing region. Most United States Attorneys also establish
district guidelines with the various federal law enforcement agen-
cies for the automatic declination of less serious cases which need
not be fully investigated. 3
The federal interest in investigating and prosecuting crime has
grown considerably as a result of the expansion of federal regula-
tion of the economy over the last fifty years, the spread of organ-
ized criminal activity in the economic structure of the country, and
the more recent adoption of federal occupational health and safety
standards. In the last ten years, there has also been a dramatic
increase in the number of public officials prosecuted for violating
the public trust, as well as an increase in activities related to or-
21. See Ruff, supra note 11, at 1211.
22. See PRINCIPLES, supra note 7, at 8.
23. The confidential declination guidelines confer no substantive right upon any litigant
and are subject to change; they are merely an administrative aid to efficient deployment of
resources.
For discussions on the relationship between federal prosecutors and law enforcement
agents in investigating and prosecuting crime, see J. EISENSTEIN, COUNSEL FOR THE UNITED
STATES 150-69 (1975); Kaplan, The Prosecutorial Discretion - A Comment, 60 Nw. U.L.
REV. 174, 182 (1965).
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ganized crime control.24 Increased public attention to corruption in
public offices, coupled with the federal government's superior in-
vestigative resources and the federal prosecutor's relative indepen-
dence of local political influence, support continued involvement
by United States Attorneys in prosecuting public corruption at all
levels. Similarly, the federal interest in the economy and in the
solvency and integrity of financial institutions support active fed-
eral investigation and prosecution of white collar and organized
crime.
Since organized crime tends to cross jurisdictional lines, the fed-
eral government has developed resources for multijurisdictional co-
ordination, including cooperation with state and local authorities.
Successful investigations have been conducted in recent years in
the Western District of Virginia by several federal law enforcement
agencies in cooperation with local and state authorities in a num-
ber of states. Nine persons were convicted in 1981 in a conspiracy
to transport stolen heavy equipment from Georgia to Virginia.25
The case represented the joint efforts of local, state, and federal
officials in Georgia and Virginia and was a classic example of or-
ganized criminal activities which cross jurisdictional lines. In an-
other case,26 a number of corporations and individuals residing in
such diverse states as Ohio, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, New York,
and Virginia were convicted in a conspiracy to manufacture and
distribute illegal M-80 fireworks in two plants in western Virginia.
In 1980, a seven state law enforcement cooperative, known as the
Leviticus project, was created to deal with organized crime in the
nation's coal fields. This project has resulted in prosecutions rang-
ing from murder for hire to heavy equipment fraud.27
B. Directing the Investigation
In directing an investigation, the federal prosecutor has the re-
sponsibility to protect the constitutional rights of suspects. This
duty stems not only from the ethical concern for fairness, but from
the practical concern that important evidence might thereby be ex-
24. See 1979 ATr'Y GEN. ANN. REP. 52-54. Cf. 1970 Arr'y GEN. ANN. REP. 49, 51. Federal
organized crime control efforts began in earnest during the Kennedy Administration in the
early 1960's and have continued to increase since then. See In re Persico, 522 F.2d 41, 49
(2d Cir. 1975).
25. See United States v. Mitchell, No. 81-00037 (W.D. Va. Apr. 14, 1981).
26. United States v. McKenzie, No. 80-00121 (W.D. Va. Sept. 16, 1980).
27. See, e.g., United States v. Atkinson, No. 81-00082 (W.D. Va. Aug. 19, 1981); Common-
wealth v. Herring, No. F-1719 (Cir. Ct. Lee County, Va., Sept. 15, 1980).
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cluded at trial on the grounds it was obtained illegally. Likewise,
both ethical and practical considerations require the prosecutor to
conduct a thorough investigation prior to seeking an indictment or
prosecuting a charge. The ethical canons provide that the prosecu-
tor should not "intentionally" avoid pursuing evidence when he be-
lieves it will damage his case or aid the accused.2 s Beyond these
minimum requirements, however, a prosecutor has a professional
responsibility to investigate his case thoroughly in order to dimin-
ish the chance that an innocent person will be charged or that a
guilty one will be acquitted.
The federal prosecutor ordinarily should not seek an indictment
unless there is a "probability of conviction" and not just "probable
cause." 29 This standard is higher than the traditional ethical stan-
dard that the prosecutor shall not prosecute a charge which he
knows is not supported by probable cause.30 The policy is founded
upon fairness to the defendant and the economic use of taxpayers'
funds. Occasionally, a prosecutor may feel that the interests of jus-
tice require that he "take his best shot" at prosecuting a certain
defendant even though the chances of conviction are not good due
to the attitude of the community towards certain factors in the
case, such as may exist in a civil rights prosecution. A decision
under such circumstances, however, must be very carefully made
after weighing all the factors involved.31
C. Timing
Because he controls the investigation, the federal prosecutor can
often control the timing of an indictment, a major advantage in
28. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSMILITY EC 7-13 (1979).
29. PRINCIPLES, supra note 7, at 6.
30. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.8(a) (Final Draft 1982), re-
printed in 68 A.B.A.J. 1298 (1982).
31. See PRINCIPLES, supra note 7, at 6-7. There are also times when prosecutors target
certain individuals for prosecution and bring charges where the admissible evidence may not
be strong. Absent selective or arbitrary prosecution, the interests of justice may require such
action in cases in which a known major criminal figure (e.g., Al Capone) can only be success-
fully prosecuted on some "technical" charge. Although such concentration on certain targets
has been criticized by some scholars, see, e.g., Freedman, supra note 4, at 1034-35, the ap-
proach may be justifiable in certain situations. Organized crime figures, for example, are
frequently difficult to prosecute because they are "part of a hierarchy with the highest com-
mand level insulated by a series of management echelons from the lowest level of easily-
replaceable members who actually perform observable physical acts." In re Persico, supra
note 24, at 48. See also D. CRESSEY, THEFT OF THE NATION: THE STRUCTURE AND OPERATION
OF ORGANIZED CRIME IN AMERICA 109-40 (1969). See generally J. LANDESCO, ORGANIZED
CRIME IN CHICAGO (2d ed. 1968).
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view of the time constraints under the Speedy Trial Act.2 Under
this Act, a defendant must be tried within seventy days of indict-
ment, or arraignment if not previously arrested, unless a continu-
ance is granted.3 3 Some white collar criminal investigations require
many months, during which time the prosecution can tie up loose
ends, lock in witness testimony before the grand jury,34 and pre-
pare for trial. In many of these investigations, the target will have
been notified. His attorney will have been negotiating with the
government and in the process will have learned about the prose-
cution's case prior to indictment. The Speedy Trial Act insures the
defendant's right to be tried expeditiously after he is indicted, but
it also protects society's interest in speedy justice. In order to con-
tinue a trial beyond the time specified in the statute, the court
must set forth on the record reasoned findings "that the ends of
justice served [by the delay] outweigh the best interests of the
public and the defendant in a speedy trial. '35
D. Conflicts of Interest
Occasionally, a prosecutor may be faced with a conflict of inter-
est in handling an investigation and in making prosecutorial deci-
sions. Examples exist of criminal investigations involving a target
who is in some way associated with or related to the prosecutor. To
insure the appearance of impartiality, another assistant prosecutor
will ordinarily be appointed in such circumstances. Where the
United States Attorney's relationship is involved, a Special Assis-
tant United States Attorney from another district may be ap-
pointed to handle the investigation and to make all prosecutory
32. See Speedy Trial Act of 1974, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-74 (Supp. V 1981).
33. The 70 days begin to run from the date of arraignment after the indictment is re-
turned, unless the defendant is arrested prior to indictment, in which case the time begins
to run from the date of indictment. 18 U.S.C. § 1361 (1976).
34. Prior sworn testimony may be introduced as substantive evidence and not solely to
impeach the witness where the witness testifies at trial. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1).
35. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8)(A) (1976). If such a continuance is granted, the period of delay
occasioned thereby is excluded in computing the date by which the defendant must be tried.
The statute states various considerations for a continuance, including the number of parties
and the complexity of the case, but forbids a continuance based on general crowding of the
docket, failure of the government to locate available witnesses, or inadequate preparation.
See Id. § 3161(h)(8)(B)-(C) (Supp. V 1981). Courts may be most inclined to grant a continu-
ance requested by a defendant where the continuance is necessary to prevent a denial of the
"defendant's constitutional rights to assistance of counsel, to the testimony of witnesses on
his behalf, or to a trial free of prejudicial publicity." United States v. Correia, 531 F.2d 1095,




III. THE DECISION To CHARGE
The decision whether to seek an indictment and the selection of
charges are areas in which the federal prosecutor has sole, unre-
viewable discretion.3 7 Where the evidence is insufficient or the case
is minor, prosecution may be declined. A case may also be de-
clined, though the evidence is sufficient, where there is no "sub-
stantial federal interest" to be served by prosecution;38 where the
defendant can be effectively prosecuted in another jurisdiction; 39
or where there is an adequate non-criminal alternative.40 Thus, the
decision to charge involves an assessment of the strengths of the
admissible evidence and the societal and federal interests to be
vindicated.
An example of a well-publicized decision not to prosecute oc-
curred in the Western District of Virginia in 1981 and concerned
the Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization (PATCO). On
the date that PATCO went on strike, the government obtained a
restraining order requiring the strikers to go back to work. When
they refused, the strikers were potentially subject to contempt of
36. The Attorney General is authorized by 28 U.S.C. § 543(a) (1976) to appoint an attor-
ney in order to aid a United States Attorney if the public's interest would be furthered.
Such appointees have been distinguished from those appointed under 28 U.S.C. § 515(a)
(1976) and do not require specific authorization to conduct grand jury proceedings. See
United States v. Hawthorne, 626 F.2d 87, 89 (9th Cir. 1980).
37. As a member of the Executive Branch, he is charged with seeing that the laws are
"faithfully executed." U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. The courts have upheld his broad discretion
in initiating prosecutions and selecting charges. See, e.g., Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456
(1962).
38. PRINCIPLES, supra note 7, at 7. In deciding whether there is a "substantial federal
interest" to be served by the prosecution, the federal prosecutor should weigh, among other
relevant factors, the following:
(a) federal law enforcement priorities; (b) the nature and seriousness of the offense;
(c) the deterrent effect of prosecution; (d) the person's culpability in connection with
the offense; (e) the person's history with respect to criminal activity; (f) the person's
willingness to cooperate in the investigation or prosecution of others; and (g) the
probable sentence or other consequences if the person is convicted.
Id.
39. Id. at 11. The prosecutor's decision is based mainly on: "(a) the strength of the other
jurisdiction's interest in prosecution; (b) the other jurisdiction's ability and willingness to
prosecute effectively; and (c) the probable sentence or other consequences if the person is
convicted in the other jurisdiction." Id.
40. Id. at 13. The prosecutor should consider: "(a) the sanctions available under the alter-
native means of disposition; (b) the likelihood that an appropriate sanction will be imposed;
and (c) the effect of non-criminal disposition on federal law enforcement interests." Id.
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court citation and criminal prosecution.41 PATCO leaders publicly
stated an intention to defy the injunction and not to return to
work. However, after careful deliberation, the decision was made
not to press for an indictment or otherwise to charge anyone with a
federal crime. First, all those who had refused to go back to work
during the first forty-eight hours of the strike were fired by Presi-
dent Reagan. This action substantially undercut a principal ration-
ale for prosecuting the strikers, which would have been to force
them back to work. Moreover, there had been no intimidation, har-
assment, or obstruction of operations in western Virginia where the
strikers had been peaceful. Thus, the judgment by the United
States Attorney as to the federal interest to be vindicated mili-
tated against prosecution of the striking PATCO members.
The exercise of prosecutorial discretion in charging a person
with a crime must be based on a consistent, evenhanded applica-
tion of principles. Nothing destroys public confidence in law en-
forcement more than selective prosecution or selective declination
of cases otherwise deserving of prosecution. In addition, the prose-
cutor must not be affected by the person's race, religion, sex, na-
tional origin, political affiliation, or by the prosecutor's personal
feelings, or concern for the effect of his decision on his own profes-
sional or personal circumstances.42 Finally, in exercising the deci-
sion to prosecute, the federal prosecutor may not responsibly rely
entirely upon the advice of the law enforcement agents or the
grand jury. The decision to prosecute and the selection of charges
is uniquely and exclusively the prerogative of the United States
Attorney. It involves rendering a professional judgment after
weighing the severity of the crime, the record and character of the
defendant, the resources of the office, and the quality of the
evidence.
In recent years, the pretrial diversion program has been estab-
lished as an alternative to prosecuting those persons who are ac-
cused of committing relatively minor offenses and who show prom-
ise of rehabilitation. Under this program a person is placed under
the supervision of the probation office for one year. Upon success-
ful completion of the program, the prosecutor agrees to drop
charges. There are established minimum departmental guidelines
41. All federal employees take an oath not to strike against the government. 5 U.S.C. §§
3333, 7311 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). Striking against the federal government is a crime. 18
U.S.C. § 1918 (1976).
42. PRINCIPLES, supra note 7, at 14.
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for determining who should be placed in this program, and each
United States Attorney generally has guidelines tailored to the cir-
cumstances of his district. The final decision to offer pretrial diver-
sion rests within the sole discretion of the United States
Attorney.4
IV. GRAND JURY PROCEEDINGS
An area of hot dispute in criminal procedure involves the rights
of defendants and witnesses in grand jury proceedings.44 The only
persons who are authorized under the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure to appear at a federal grand jury session are: the witness
who is actually testifying, the government counsel, the court re-
porter, and the grand jurors.45 Neither witnesses nor targets of in-
vestigations are entitled to have an attorney appear with them
before the grand jury. The grand jury hearing is not an adversary
proceeding. The role of the grand jury is not to determine guilt or
innocence but to investigate crimes and to determine whether
there is probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed
and that the person named in the indictment committed the crime.
Courts have rejected arguments which would turn the grand jury
hearing into an adversary proceeding.4 A target of a grand jury
43. U.S. ATTORNEY'S MANUAL, supra note 10, § 1-12.100. Some states also have a pretrial
diversion program. See, e.g., Note, Kansas Diversion: Defendants' Remedies and
Prosecutorial Opportunities, 20 WASHBURN L.J. 344 (1981). In the federal system, guidelines
vary from district to district depending on priorities and resources. Generally, the defendant
should have cooperated with the authorities and admitted his or her involvement. In addi-
tion, the defendant must at most have a limited prior criminal record. Where money is
involved in the crime, it should not be a substantial amount, and certain offenses-such as
violations of the public trust, organized crime activities, and crimes involving national secur-
ity-may not be acceptable for disposition by pretrial diversion. See U.S. ATrORNEY'S MAN-
UAL, supra note 10, § 1-12.100.
44. Congress has considered broadening the rights of targets by allowing defense attor-
neys to appear in grand jury sessions. See, e.g., S. 988, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); H.R.
4272, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981). The American Bar Association supports these bills along
with other comprehensive reforms of the grand jury system. See, e.g., A.B.A. Backs Grant-
Jury Reform; Lobbying Fails, A.B.A.J. 1188 (1977); ABA Criminal Justice Section, Policy
on the Grand Jury, 68 A.B.A.J. 1214 (1982); Grand Juries Go on Trial, 63 A.B.A.J. 775
(1977). The Department of Justice has also studied possible reforms. See, e.g., Memoran-
dum on the Grand Jury Hearings on H.R.J. Res. 46, H.R. 1277, and Related Bills Before
the Subcomm. on Immigration, Citizenship and International Law of the House Comm. on
the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 86-107 (1976); Civiletti & Walsh, The Grand Jury Goes
to Trial, 4 LiTiGATION 37 (1978).
45. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(d).
46. See, e.g., United States v. Gardner, 516 F.2d 334 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 861
(1975); United States v. Mandel, 415 F. Supp. 1033, 1040 (D. Md. 1976).
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investigation has no right to appear before the grand jury and tes-
tify, present any evidence, or make any argument in his own be-
half. The Supreme Court has held that questioning a witness
under subpoena may not be so coercive as to qualify as custodial
interrogation by police so that warnings are not constitutionally
mandated. 47
As a matter of policy, however, the Department of Justice has
adopted certain procedures to protect the rights of targets of inves-
tigations. When a person becomes a target of a grand jury investi-
gation, the prosecutor may, at his option, send the person a letter
advising him of this fact and inviting the person to testify on a
voluntary basis. The target is advised of the general subject matter
of the grand jury investigation, of his fifth amendment privilege
not to answer any questions that might tend to incriminate him,
and of the risk that any testimony he gives could be used against
him. He is also advised of his right to have an attorney accompany
him and wait outside the grand jury room and to consult with his
attorney outside the grand jury room at reasonable intervals. 48
His ethical duties enjoin the prosecutor from misleading the
grand jury by withholding important exculpatory evidence or
knowingly failing to disclose evidence which tends substantially to
negate guilt.49 However, the extent to which he seeks out and
presents exculpatory evidence to the grand jury and cross-exam-
ines witnesses to test their credibility is left to his sound judgment.
The prosecutor can often better discover the strengths and weak-
nesses of his case by presenting certain evidence to the grand jury
and observing its reaction. Thus, fairness to targets and thorough-
ness in preparing the case for eventual trial ordinarily require that
the prosecutor present exculpatory evidence to the grand jury.50
Since the rules of evidence do not apply to grand jury proceed-
ings,51 indictments are often obtained based on a summary of the
investigation given by the federal law enforcement agent. However,
at least one court has said that the prosecutor must make clear to
47. See United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181 (1977).
48. U.S. ATTORNEY'S MANUAL, supra note 10, § 9-11.250.
49. See U.S. ArORNEY'S MANUAL, supra note 10, § 9-11.334.
50. See generally Comment, Criminal Procedure-District Attorney Is Under an Im-
plied Statutory Duty to Inform Grand Jury of Exculpatory Evidence, 25 CATH. U.L. REv.
648 (1976).
51. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 349-52 (1974); Costello v. United States,
350 U.S. 359 (1956).
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the grand jury the quality of evidence being presented.2
The grand jury is an effective and potent instrument for the in-
vestigation of crime because of its power to subpoena witnesses for
secret testimony and compel production of documents and things.
Together with the Witness Protection Program, for relocating and
changing the identity of crucial witnesses, and the prosecutor's
power to grant immunity and force indispensable testimony, the
federal grand jury has been particularly effective in uncovering or-
ganized criminal activity. It has also been used effectively in coor-
dinating complex multi-agency white collar crime investigations.
Because of his power, the federal prosecutor should not give the
appearance of attempting to dominate or manipulate unfairly the
grand jury. As a matter of practice, the grand jurors should be ad-
vised that they can request additional evidence if they believe it
would be helpful or necessary. In some cases, this may include in-
viting a target to testify. The grand jurors should be treated in
practice, and not merely in form, as partners of the prosecutor in
developing the evidence. Further, they should be encouraged to ex-
ercise their independent judgment and not simply to "rubber
stamp" the prosecutor's. Confidence in the fair and effective ad-
ministration of justice is best achieved by having the grand jury
participate fully in the process of investigation and indictment.
The return of an indictment requires concurrence of both the
United States Attorney and at least twelve members of the twenty-
three member grand jury. Therefore, either can prevent the indict-
ment.5 3 Recent publicity concerning the Watergate grand jury's ap-
parent disagreement with Special Prosecutor Leon Jaworski over
whether to indict former President Richard Nixon has highlighted
this safeguard in the administration of justice. On the one hand,
the prosecutor has unique authority and special responsibility in
exercising his discretion to seek an indictment. Conversely, the
grand jury as representative of the community 4 has the unfettered
power to refuse to return a true bill. 5 When the prosecutor, after
52. See, e.g., United States v. Estepa, 471 F.2d 1132 (2d Cir. 1972) (indictment dismissed
where prosecutor failed to disclose hearsay nature of evidence and relied on hearsay when
first hand evidence was available).
53. FED. R. CraM. P. 6(b)(2).
54. See 28 U.S.C. § 1861 (1976).
55. The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution provides that "[n]o person
shall be held to answer for a capital or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment of
a Grand Jury. . . ." U.S. CONST. amend V.
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obtaining a "no true bill" from one grand jury, wishes to seek an
indictment from another grand jury, he should proceed cautiously
and assess his evidence carefully so as not to give the appearance
of unfairly manipulating the system. Ordinarily, he should have
developed additional inculpatory evidence before proceeding to
present his case to a second grand jury.
All grand jury proceedings are secret, and neither the defendant
nor his counsel is entitled to have access to what occurs in the ses-
sion. However, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure require
that all matters occurring before the grand jury be recorded."
Where a particularized need is shown, a court may order the
United States Attorney to supply transcripts of the grand jury ses-
sion.57 Moreover, once a witness testifies in open court, defense
counsel may request a court order directing the government to fur-
nish a transcript of the witness's grand jury testimony.58
V. DISCOVERY
In most federal districts, the general practice is to allow open-file
discovery in the interest of fairness to the defendant. Under the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, a defendant has the right to
discover his own statements,59 his prior record, e0 and certain docu-
56. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(2).
57. See Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S. 855 (1966).
58. 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1976).
59. Rule 16(a)(1)(A) provides:
Upon request of a defendant the government shall permit the defendant to inspect
and copy or photograph: any relevant written or recorded statements made by the
defendant, or copies thereof, within the possession, custody or control of the govern-
ment, the existence of which is known, or by the exercise of due diligence may be-
come known, to the attorney for the government; the substance of any oral statement
which the government intends to offer in evidence at the trial made by the defendant
whether before or after arrest in response to interrogation by any person then known
to the defendant to be a government agent; and recorded testimony of the defendant
before a grand jury which relates to the offense charged. Where the defendant is a
corporation, partnership, association or labor union, the court may grant the defend-
ant, upon its motion, discovery of relevant recorded testimony of any witness before a
grand jury who (1) was, at the time of his testimony, so situated as an officer or
employee as to have been able legally to bind the defendant in respect to conduct
constituting the offense, or (2) was, at the time of the offense, personally involved in
the alleged conduct constituting the offense and so situated as an officer or employee
as to have been able legally to bind the defendant in respect to that alleged conduct
in which he was involved.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1)(A).
60. Rule 16(a)(1)(B) provides:
Upon request of the defendant, the government shall furnish to the defendant such
copy of his prior criminal record, if any, as is within the possession, custody, or con-
526
1983] FEDERAL PROSECUTORS 527
ments and tangible objects.61 Moreover, he may discover reports of
any examinations and tests material to his defense or to be used by
the government in its case in chief.62 Statements of witnesses, how-
ever, are subject to the Jencks Act, 3 which provides that the fed-
eral prosecutor need not reveal to the defense the statement of any
government witness until after the witness has testified at trial.
The Jencks Act was intended to accommodate the competing in-
terests of preserving the government's evidence while ensuring the
defendant's due process right of effective cross-examination. Be-
cause of the risk of intimidation, undue influence, or worse, the
government should have some way to protect the identities of its
witnesses. At the same time, as a matter of fairness and due pro-
cess, a defendant should have an opportunity to prepare his de-
fense, which requires knowing and investigating the evidence
against him and interviewing witnesses. As a practical matter, the
competing concerns are resolved informally in most cases, espe-
trol of the government, the existence of which is known, or by the exercise of due
diligence may become known, to the attorney for the government.
FED. R. CraM. P. 16(a)(1)(B).
61. Rule 16(a)(1)(C) provides:
Upon request of the defendant the government shall permit the defendant to inspect
and copy or photograph books, papers, documents, photographs, tangible objects,
buildings or places, or copies or portions thereof, which are within the possession,
custody or control of the government, and which are material to the preparation of
his defense or are intended for use by the government as evidence in chief at the trial,
or were obtained from or belong to the defendant.
FED. R. CraM. P. 16(a)(1)(C).
62. Rule 16(a)(1)(D) provides:
Upon request of a defendant the government shall permit the defendant to inspect
and copy or photograph any results or reports of physical or mental examinations,
and of scientific tests or experiments, or copies thereof, which are within the posses-
sion, custody or control of the government, the existence of which is known, or by the
exercise of due diligence may become known, to the attorney for the government, and
which are material to the preparation of the defense or are intended for use by the
government as evidence in chief at the trial.
FED. R. CraM. P. 16(a)(1)(D).
63. 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1976). The Jencks Act is named for Jencks v. United States, 353
U.S. 657 (1957) (defendant entitled to inspect witness statements in the government's pos-
session for use in cross-examination). The Act provides in pertinent part:
After a witness called by the United States has testified on direct examination, the
court shall, on motion of the defendant, order the United States to produce any state-
ment (as hereinafter defined) of the witness in the possession of the United States
which relates to the subject matter as to which the witness has testified. If the entire
contents of any such statement relate to the subject matter of the testimony of the
witness, the court shall order it to be delivered directly to the defendant for his ex-
amination and use.
18 U.S.C. § 3500(b) (1976).
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cially where there is a cooperative, professional working relation-
ship between the prosecutor and defense counsel. 4 Even when the
Jencks Act is invoked, the material is rarely delivered to defense
counsel later than the night before trial if only to avoid the trial
being interrupted by long recesses to allow defense counsel to re-
view the statements. In the interest of fairness and orderly trial
proceedings, the Jencks Act should not be invoked unless there is
an articulable fear of witness intimidation or undue influence.
Criminal defense attorneys sometimes meet resistance in at-
tempting to interview government witnesses. Counsel should be
careful about insisting on talking to a hostile witness; an aggressive
interviewing technique might be construed as an attempt to intim-
idate the witness. In such circumstances, defense counsel can re-
quest the prosecutor to intercede. If the witness remains hostile,
defense counsel can demonstrate his attitude to the jury on cross-
examination.
Federal Rule 16 also provides for limited reciprocal discovery by
the government of documents, tangible objects, and reports of ex-
aminations and tests which the defense intends to introduce in its
case-in-chief.6 5 The availability to the government of this discovery
64. The Federal Rules contemplate that the parties should carry out discovery matters by
themselves with court involvement only where necessary. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 16 advisory
committee notes (1974).
65. Rule 16(b) provides:
(1) Information Subject to Disclosure.
(A) Documents and Tangible Objects. If the defendant requests disclosure under
subdivision (a)(1)(C) or (D) of this rule, upon compliance with such request by the
government, the defendant, on request of the government, shall permit the govern-
ment to inspect and copy or photograph books, papers, documents, photographs,
tangible objects, or copies or portions thereof, which are within the possession, cus-
tody, or control of the defendant and which the defendant intends to introduce as
evidence in chief at the trial.
(B) Reports of Examinations and Tests. If the defendant requests disclosure under
subdivision (a)(1)(C) or (D) of this rule, upon compliance with such request by the
government, the defendant, on request of the government, shall permit the govern-
ment to inspect and copy or photograph any results or reports of physical or
mental examinations and of scientific tests or experiments made in connection with
the particular case, or copies thereof, within the possession or control of the de-
fendant, which the defendant intends to introduce as evidence in chief at the trial
or which were prepared by a witness whom the defendant intends to call at the
trial when the results or reports relate to his testimony.
(2) Information Not Subject to Disclosure. Except as to scientific or medical reports,
this subdivision does not authorize the discovery or inspection of reports, memo-
randa, or other internal defense documents made by the defendant, or his attorneys
or agents in connection with the investigation or defense of the case, or of statements
made by the defendant, or by government or defense witnesses, or by prospective
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device is triggered when the defendant makes a similar request.66
The government may also request that the defendant file a notice
of any alibi defense, setting forth the place where he claims to have
been at the time of the offense and the witnesses upon which he
relies.67 Similarly, the defense may be required upon request to
give notice of intent to rely upon a defense of insanity or otherwise
to present expert testimony on mental condition."
Finally, in discovery proceedings, both ethical and due process
concerns require the prosecution to divulge any exculpatory evi-
dence upon request69 and, if sufficiently material to raise a reason-
able doubt as to the defendant's guilt, even without a request.70
Where there is any question of the materiality of the evidence or
the necessity of disclosure, in camera review by the court may be
requested. Further, the duty to disclose goes beyond matters in the
prosecutor's possession; he must look beyond his files and disclose
matters which "by the exercise of due diligence may become
known.17 1
VI. PLEA BARGAINING
Another area involving delicate decision-making is that of plea
bargaining. In recent years, this has become a controversial area in
which the public has perceived that justice is not served when a
lenient "deal" is struck between the government and a guilty de-
fendant. However, plea bargaining is essential to conserve the time
and resources of the prosecutor and the courts and to avoid the
inherent risks of litigation. More significantly, it can be an effective
tool for the prosecutor to use in gaining the cooperation and indis-
government or defense witnesses, to the defendant, his agents or attorneys.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(b).
66. See supra notes 62-63.
67. FED. R. CRIM. P. 12.1.
68. Id.
69. The Supreme Court has held that "the suppression by the prosecution of evidence
favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material
either to guilt or punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution."
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
70. In United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976), the Court refined Brady and stated that
due process would be violated (1) where the prosecutor knowingly uses perjured testimony,
and there is a reasonable likelihood it could have affected the jury verdict; (2) where the
prosecutor fails to disclose exculpatory evidence after a specific request, and the undisclosed
information might have affected the outcome of the trial; and (3) where, after a general
request or no request by the defense, the prosecutor fails to disclose information sufficiently
material as to raise a reasonable doubt about the guilt of the defendant.
71. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1)(A)-(D).
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pensable testimony of persons involved in crimes and thus to con-
vict accomplices.
The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure authorize the prosecu-
tor upon a defendant's plea of guilty to move for dismissal of other
pending charges, to make a sentencing recommendation, or not to
oppose the defendant's request for a particular sentence.71 More-
over, the prosecutor may enter into a binding agreement concern-
ing a specific sentence.73 If a non-binding recommendation is made
regarding sentencing, the defendant may not withdraw his plea
even if the court imposes a stiffer sentence than was expected.74
In the federal system, the judge has sole discretion in sentenc-
ing;73 federal judges are very protective of their prerogative in this
area. For this reason, and to avoid any public perception that a
"deal" was struck contrary to the public interest, some districts
have established a policy whereby the government ordinarily will
not make agreements, or recommendations to the court, regarding
sentencing. In those districts, plea bargaining is ordinarily limited
to dismissing charges. The prosecution may, and often does, intro-
duce information regarding the circumstances of the offense and
the character of the accused to assist the court in fashioning an
appropriate sentence. However, the primary advisory function re-
garding sentencing is carried out by the probation office in its pre-
sentence report, which carries a confidential sentencing recommen-
dation that neither side is privileged to see.71
In negotiating a plea agreement, the prosecution must be aware
that the charge or charges to which a defendant pleads guilty
should bear a "reasonable relationship to the nature and extent of
his criminal conduct" 77 and must be supported by an "adequate
factual basis. '78 If restitution is involved, the counts should be suf-
ficient to provide for an appropriate restitution order; the prosecu-
tor should insure that the interests of the victim are not lost in the
sentencing process. The prosecution should also insure that the
judge has a sufficient maximum range within which to impose an
72. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(e)(1).
73. Id.
74. Since the court may not participate in plea negotiations, id., it is not appropriate for
the prosecutor to seek the advice of the probation office, which is an arm of the court,
regarding the plea negotiations.
75. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(a).
76. Id. 32(c).




adequate sentence. Finally, any plea agreement should not ad-
versely affect any other investigation or prosecution.7 9 In addition
to promoting the efficient administration of justice, plea bargaining
should further the ends of justice by gaining needed cooperation.
The policy of the Department of Justice has been to oppose any
nolo contendere plea on the grounds that such pleas tend to cause
public disrespect for the criminal process.80 Under the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure, a court is required to consider the
"views of the parties and the interest of the public in the effective
administration of justice"81 before accepting a nolo contendere
plea. Thus, a defendant has no absolute right to enter a plea of
nolo contendere. Where a defendant attempts so to plead, the fed-
eral prosecutor should make an offer of proof of facts that the de-
fendant committed the offense charged, state on the record why
such a plea should be rejected by the court, and oppose dismissal
of any charges to which the defendant does not plead nolo con-
tendere s2 Except in rare circumstances, nolo contendere pleas fail
to serve justice since no definite determination is made regarding
the guilt of the defendant, and the public perceives a failure of the
system in this lack of resolution.
The principal rationale for nolo contendere pleas is to allow the
defendant to avoid the use of the criminal conviction against him
in a subsequent civil suit or in a licensing or other collateral pro-
79. Id.
80. In 1953, in a Department of Justice directive, the Attorney General expressed objec-
tions to such pleas:
One of the factors which has tended to breed contempt for federal law enforcement in
recent times has been the practice of permitting as a matter of course in many crimi-
nal indictments the plea of nolo contendere. While it may serve a legitimate purpose
in a few extraordinary situations and where civil litigation is also pending, I can see
no justification for it as an everyday practice, particularly where it is used to avoid
certain indirect consequences of pleading guilty, such as loss of license or sentencing
as a multiple offender. Uncontrolled use of the plea has led to shockingly low
sentences and insignificant fines which are no deterrent to crime. As a practical mat-
ter it accomplished little that is useful even where the Government has civil litigation
pending. Moreover, a person permitted to plead nolo contendere admits his guilt for
the purpose of imposing punishment for his acts and yet, for all other purposes, and
as far as the public is concerned, persists in his denial of wrongdoing. It is no wonder
that the public regards consent to such a plea by the Government as an admission
that it has only a technical case at most and that the whole proceeding was just a
fiasco.
PRINCIPLES, supra note 7, at 33.
81. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b).
82. PRINCIPLES, supra note 7, at 34-35. See also Note, Nolo Contendere: Acceptance in
Federal Courts, 10 Mam. ST. U. L. REv. 550 (1980).
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ceeding.83 However, allowing a nolo contendere plea is rarely justi-
fied on this ground. First, courts have often allowed administrative
use of a criminal conviction based upon a nolo contendere plea,
such as in a proceeding to revoke a license, anyway. 4 Moreover,
where civil liability is involved and the criminal case precedes the
civil trial, the victim would receive little benefit from the criminal
prosecution if the defendant were allowed to plead nolo contendere
and avoid the logical consequences of his criminal conviction.
Criminal prosecution should further the interests of victims in be-
ing made whole as well as vindicate society's interests. Thus, the
prosecutor's opposition to nolo contendere pleas should ordinarily
be even stronger where civil recovery is or might be sought as a
result of the defendant's criminal activity.
VII. CONDUCT OF THE TRIAL
At the heart of Anglo-American legal tradition is the belief that
the truth is best revealed through the adversarial procedure of a
trial.8 5 A criminal trial is, however, both more and less than a
search for the truth. It is an expression of societal values of fair-
ness and due process representing the vindication of individual lib-
erties against the power of the state. Thus, the truth-seeking func-
tion may be sacrificed by rules which exclude illegally seized
evidence 6 or illegally obtained confessions,87 and which sanction
83. Unlike a guilty plea or judgment entered on a jury finding of guilty, a conviction
based on a nolo contendere plea may not be used as collateral estoppel to obtain summary
judgment in a subsequent civil suit. Nor is such a plea or any statements made in connec-
tion with it admissible in any other civil or criminal proceeding against the defendant. FED.
R. CRIM. P. 11(e)(6). See Dalweld Co. v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 252 F. Supp. 939
(S.D.N.Y. 1966). Such a plea, however, may be used for impeachment of the witness as a
prior "conviction". FED. R. EVID. 609(a). See 18 U.S.C. § 5006(g) ("conviction" defined in
Youth Corrections Act as "judgment on a verdict or finding of guilty, a plea of guilty or a
plea of nolo contendere.") See also Lott v. United States, 367 U.S. 421 (1961); Fisher v.
United States, 8 F.2d 978, 981 (lst Cir.1925); Oklahoma v. Allied Chem. Corp., 312 F. Supp.
130, 133-34 (W.D. Okla. 1968); Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 211
F. Supp. 712 (N.D. Ill. 1962). But see United States v. Morrow, 537 F.2d 120, 142-45 (5th
Cir. 1976) (Fifth Circuit rule).
84. See Sokoloff v. Saxbe, 501 F.2d 571 (2d Cir. 1974) (physician's license revoked based
on nolo contendere plea to illegal distribution of drugs); Maryland State Bar Ass'n v. Ag-
new, 318 A.2d 811 (Md. Ct. App. 1974) (disbarment of lawyer); Lee v. Wisconsin State Bd.
of Dental Examiners, 29 Wis. 2d 330, 139 N.W.2d 61 (1966) (revocation of dentist license).
85. See generally Frankel, The Search for Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. REV.
1031 (1975).
86. See Mapp v. Ohio, 287 U.S. 643 (1961); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
87. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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the defendant's right not to testify."s
This tension between the search for truth and the protection of
individual rights places a special responsibility on the prosecutor.
He must seek to have the truth of criminal activity disclosed in
court, but he must also see that societal values are preserved in the
process. 9 Thus, the prosecutor, as well as the judge, has a duty to
insure that a defendant receives a fair trial. The prosecution also
has an interest in protecting the record and taking steps to avoid
occurrences which may cause reversible error or mistrial. The care-
ful prosecutor should try every case with one eye on the trial re-
cord and another on the potential for appellate review.
In the heat of trial, it is sometimes tempting for a zealous prose-
cutor to overreach the bounds of propriety in order to obtain a
conviction. However vigorously he advocates, the prosecutor must
not knowingly offer inadmissible evidence, introduce false evi-
dence, or otherwise seek to mislead the court or jury.90 When a
government witness testifies with immunity from prosecution or
under a plea agreement, 1 the prosecutor should usually disclose
this on direct examination. 2 Thus, the virtue of full disclosure
joins with the interest of defusing the adverse impact of such evi-
dence on the credibility of the witness. In cross-examining a de-
fense witness whom he knows to be telling the truth, the prosecu-
tor should not attempt to use techniques that make it appear that
the witness is lying, since to do so would mislead the court. The
prosecutor in such circumstances should confine his cross-examina-
tion to the "conventional" ways of testing the witness's perception
88. See Frankel, supra note 85, at 1036-37. See also Schwartz, supra note 5, at 17-30.
89. Frankel, supra note 85, at 1036-37.
90. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102 (1979); STANDARDS RE-
LATING TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE: THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 5.6
(1974) [hereinafter cited as ABA PROSECUTION FUNCTION].
91. Obtaining cooperative testimony from an accomplice may be essential to successful
prosecution of others. Since a witness who is also culpable may refuse cooperation on the
basis of his fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination, the prosecutor may seek to
induce cooperation in other ways. First, if time permits, the witness himself may be tried
and convicted. Then, after he would ordinarily no longer have a valid privilege against testi-
fying, he may be induced to cooperate as a condition of his receiving a lesser sentence.
Second, the parties may enter into a plea agreement where the defendant pleads guilty to
reduced charges, where the prosecutor makes a sentencing recommendation, or where the
parties agree to a specific sentence. Finally, the government may consent to a non-prosecu-
tion agreement in return for the cooperation of a witness, or grant "use immunity" to com-
pel testimony. 18 U.S.C. § 6001 et seq. (1976 and Supp. IV 1980).
92. The Federal Rules of Evidence provide: "The credibility of a witness may be attacked
by any party, including the party calling him." FED. R. Evm. 607.
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and memory without discrediting him personally by showing bias
or evidence of prior convictions. 3
Because a prosecutor represents the government and law en-
forcement, jurors may give his statements added credibility.
Therefore, while he must prosecute vigorously, he must be scrupu-
lously fair in arguing his case. In closing argument he should not
make statements calculated to inflame the jury;94 neither should he
give personal opinions,9 5 make unduly harsh characterizations of
the defendant, defense witnesses, or counsel,96 nor argue that in
order to acquit, the jury must find that government witnesses com-
mitted perjury.97 The prosecutor also may not comment on the de-
fendant's failure to testify."" In some circuits the prosecutor may
not argue that the government's evidence in whole or in part is
"unrebutted", "uncontradicted", or "undisputed" or use other
terms that refer to the defendant's assertion of his fifth amend-
ment privilege not to testify.99
The manner in which due process is administered in an open
trial by the prosecutor and the court, as perceived by the public,
the jury and the defendant, affects our criminal justice system
more than the outcome of any given trial. Conscientious adherence
to due process values gain for the criminal justice system citizen
respect and support by which the system maintains its moral
legitimacy.
VIII. RELATIONS WITH THE PRESS
Publication of the results of law enforcement efforts can often
have a deterrent effect on criminal activity. Therefore, in dealing
with the press, the United States Attorney should seek a coopera-
tive relationship while guarding against publication of confidential
or prejudicial information. 100 In seeking information for a story, ag-
93. ABA PROSECUrION FUNCTION, supra note 90, § 5.7. See Civiletti, supra note 4, at 18.
94. ABA PROSECUTION FUNCTION, supra note 90, § 5.8(c).
95. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSmILITY DR 7-106(c) (3)-(4) (1979); ABA PROS-
ECUTION FUNCTION, supra note 90, § 5.8(b).
96. See, e.g., United States v. Spain, 536 F.2d 170 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 833
(1976).
97. See, e.g., United States v. Vargas, 583 F.2d 380 (7th Cir. 1978); United States v. Phil-
lips, 527 F.2d 1021 (7th Cir. 1975).
98. See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, reh'g denied, 381 U.S. 957 (1965).
99. See, e.g., United States v. Moody, No. 78-1981 (7th Cir. Feb. 27, 1979). This is not the
law in the Fourth Circuit today.
100. See generally The Supreme Court, 1978 Term, 93 HARV. L. REv. 1, 62 (1979).
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gressive news reporters often attempt to probe confidential areas.
Restrictions should therefore be placed on the media's access to
the office, and procedures and guidelines should be established for
dealing with the press. Also, office security procedures must be ad-
equate to protect confidential information and materials.
The Department of Justice has established regulations governing
the release of information to the public. 10 1 These general guidelines
make an effort to strike a "fair balance between the protection of
individuals accused of crime or involved in civil proceedings with
the government and public understandings of the problems of con-
trolling crime and administering government . ,, o0 Generally,
no comment should be made regarding whether an investigation
may or may not be in progress. When an indictment is returned,
the guidelines specify the types of information which may legiti-
mately be released.10 3 Basically, the United States Attorney should
101. See 28 C.F.R. § 50.2 (1981); U.S. ATTORNEY's MANUAL, supra note 10, § 9-2.200, .210-
11.
102. 28 C.F.R. § 50.2(a)(2).
103. The guidelines for release of information in criminal cases are as follows:
(1) These guidelines shall apply to the release of information to news media from the
time a person is the subject of a criminal investigation until any proceeding resulting
from such an investigation has been terminated by trial or otherwise.
(2) At no time shall personnel of the Department of Justice furnish any statement or
information for the purpose of influencing the outcome of a defendant's trial, nor
shall personnel of the Department furnish any statement or information, which could
reasonably be expected to be disseminated by means of public communication, if
such a statement or information may reasonably be expected to influence the out-
come of a pending or future trial.
(3) Personnel of the Department of Justice, subject to specific limitations imposed by
law or court rule or order, may make public the following information:
(i) The defendant's name, age, residence, employment, marital status, and similar
background information.
(ii) The substance or text of the charge, such as a complaint, indictment, or
information.
(iii) The identity of the investigating and/or arresting agency and the length or
scope of an investigation.
(iv) The circumstances immediately surrounding an arrest, resistance, pursuit, pos-
session and use of weapons, and a description of physical items seized at the time
of arrest. Disclosures should include only incontrovertible, factual matters, and
should not include subjective observations. In addition, where background informa-
tion or information relating to the circumstances of an arrest or investigation would
be highly prejudicial or where the release thereof would serve no law enforcement
function, such information should not be made public.
(4) Personnel of the Department shall not disseminate any information concerning a
defendant's prior criminal record.
(5) Because of the particular danger of prejudice resulting from statements in the
period approaching and during trial, they ought strenuously to be avoided during
that period. Any such statement or release shall be made only on the infrequent occa-
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release only "bare bones" information relative to an indictment.
All formal press releases on indictments should end with a state-
ment that the grand jury indictment is only a charge and not evi-
dence of guilt and that the defendant is entitled to a fair trial with
the burden on the government to prove guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. At no time should the government release information
which might reasonably be expected to influence the outcome of a
trial.
Despite regulations and diligent efforts by prosecutors to com-
ply, news stories occasionally appear concerning sensitive, highly
confidential investigations. Similarly, rumors about investigations
sometimes occur, and these too can lead to problems. Whenever
news leaks or rumors occur, or there is any suggestion of impropri-
ety, an investigation may be conducted to clear up the matter and
insure that the government carries out its activities in a wholly
sion when circumstances absolutely demand a disclosure of information and shall in-
clude only information which is clearly not prejudicial.
(6) The release of certain types of information generally tends to create dangers of
prejudice without serving a significant law enforcement function. Therefore, person-
nel of the Department should refrain from making available the following:
(i) Observations about a defendant's character.
(ii) Statements, admissions, confessions, or alibis attributable to a defendant, or
the refusal or failure of the accused to make a statement.
(iii) Reference to investigative procedures such as fingerprints, polygraph examina-
tions, ballistic tests, or laboratory tests, or to the refusal by the defendant to sub-
mit to such tests or examinations.
(iv) Statements concerning the identity, testimony, or credibility of prospective
witnesses.
(v) Statements concerning evidence or argument in the case, whether or not it is
anticipated that such evidence or argument will be used at trial.
(vi) Any opinion as to the accused's guilt, or the possibility of a plea of guilty to the
offense charged, or the possibility of a plea to a lesser offense.
(7) Personnel of the Department of Justice should take no action to encourage or
assist news media in photographing or televising a defendant or accused person being
held or transported in Federal custody. Departmental representatives should not
make available photographs of a defendant unless a law enforcement function is
served thereby.
(8) This statement of policy is not intended to restrict the release of information
concerning a defendant who is a fugitive from justice.
(9) Since the purpose of this statement is to set forth generally applicable guidelines,
there will, of course, be situations in which it will limit the release of information
which would not be prejudicial under the particular circumstances. If a representative
of the Department believes that in the interest of the fair administration of justice
and the law enforcement process information beyond these guidelines should be re-
leased, in a particular case, he shall request the permission of the Attorney General or
the Deputy Attorney General to do so.
Id. § 50.2(b). Similar guidelines, though less restrictive, apply with respect to release of
information in civil actions. See id. § 50.2(c).
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proper fashion.
The role of the prosecutor is not only to prosecute the guilty, but
to clear the air regarding results of closed investigations when
there has been adverse publicity concerning innocent people. Even
when a person can not be "cleared," an investigation which has
received public attention may warrant issuance of a statement that
it is closed. The prosecutor, therefore, has a duty to protect the
names and reputations of the innocent, as well as to prosecute the
guilty.
IX. CONCLUSION
The United States Attorney is the litigating authority for the
federal government in his district in both civil and criminal mat-
ters. As prosecutor and chief federal law enforcement officer, he
has a great responsibility to ensure that justice is served. In carry-
ing out his responsibilities, he should remember the inscription in
the Attorney General's office: "The government wins its point
when justice is done its citizens in the courts."
In attempting to give content to the abstract ideal of justice, he
may establish, in his district, priorities for investigating and prose-
cuting crime which are consistent with the limitations of resources
and jurisdiction, the priorities set nationally by the Attorney Gen-
eral, the considerations of federal-state relations, the circum-
stances in his district, and his own philosophy. The setting of such
priorities is not only necessary, but desirable to ensure that law
enforcement objectives are responsive and responsible to changing
circumstances and evolving societal values. The principles underly-
ing his decisions to investigate and prosecute must be supported
by established legal and ethical standards and applied in a consis-
tent and even-handed manner. The federal prosecutor should rec-
ognize the paramount importance of preserving the values gov-
erning the administration of criminal justice. In conducting
investigations and initiating charges, he should exercise his consid-
erable discretionary powers fairly, thoughtfully and evenly. In
dealing with opposing counsel, he should seek a cooperative and
professional relationship. His advocacy at trial should be vigorous,
but accord with traditional due process values and principles of
fair play. In assisting the court in fashioning an appropriate sen-
tence, he should seek vindication of the interests of both society
and victims. Finally, he should seek a cooperative relationship with
the press so that the public is informed of law enforcement efforts
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and such publicity achieves some measure of deterrence.
The manner in which he carries out his duties-his vigor and
competence and his sense of integrity and fairness-determines
the degree of success and effectiveness of his office. Public confi-
dence in the enforcement of the laws is enhanced by his aggressive
pursuit of criminals. However, his credibility, and hence his effec-
tiveness as an instrument of the law, is judged by his sense of fair-
ness. The prosecutor serves justice when he exercises his considera-
ble powers fairly and impartially and with sensitivity to the impact"
of his decisions on those with whom he deals.
